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CHINA’S NEW ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: A PERSPECTIVE
FROM THE UNITED STATES
Thomas R. Howell, Alan Wm. Wolff, Rachel Howe, and Diane Oh†
Abstract:
In August 2007, China enacted an Anti-Monopoly Law, becoming one
of roughly ninety nations to establish a comprehensive regulatory regime governing
competition. Since the advent of China’s economic reform program beginning three
decades ago, China has been moving to integrate its economy within the global trading
system. This article provides an overview of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”)
emphasizing key areas of significant apparent divergence from U.S. antitrust policy. The
article addresses the evolution of anti-monopoly policy in China and the United States,
observing that, where differences exist, China’s AML frequently reflects principles
similar to those once embedded in U.S. antitrust policy, but which have been abandoned
or modified by U.S. policymakers and courts in a sustained process of policymaking
through trial and error. The article also examines specific areas of divergence between
the AML and U.S. antitrust policy, describing how past U.S. policies, which find
parallels in the AML, were modified or abandoned over time. Finally, the article
concludes that in enacting the AML, Chinese policymakers aim to promote economic
growth and innovation. It also expresses the hope that the U.S. experience, which was
driven by the need to increase its own economic dynamism, may serve as an abiding
point of reference to China’s policymakers.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In August 2007, China enacted an Anti-Monopoly Law, becoming one
of roughly ninety nations (including the U.S., the European Union, Canada
and Japan) to establish a comprehensive regulatory regime governing
competition.1 Since the advent of China’s economic reform program

†
Thomas R. Howell is a partner at Dewey & LeBoeuf, in its Washington D.C. office. He
has practiced in international trade matters for more than 20 years. His practice includes litigation
pursuant to the U.S. trade remedies; support for international negotiations; and securing market
access abroad. A particular area of experience has been developing and analyzing comprehensive
information about industrial policies, private commercial practices and economic systems outside
the United States. Alan Wolff is also a partner at Dewey & LeBoeuf and leads its International
Trade Practice Group. He also served as United States Deputy Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations (1977–1979) in the Carter Administration, holding the rank of ambassador, after
having served as General Counsel of the agency from 1974–1977. The International Trade
Practice Group is active in efforts to limit trade-distorting practices such as dumping and
subsidies, private anticompetitive practices, violations of intellectual property rights and traderelated investment performance requirements. Rachel Howe is an international research advisor
at Dewey & LeBoeuf. Diane Oh is an international trade specialist at Dewey & LeBoeuf.
1
Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Aug. 1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.
lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=6351&keyword=monopoly [hereinafter AML].
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beginning three decades ago, China has been moving to integrate its
economy within the global trading system.
In contrast to China’s World Trade Organization (“WTO”) accession,
no established global framework of rules exists with respect to competition
policy, reflecting a lack of global consensus on the goals and methods of
competition policy enforcement.2 National competition regimes and policies
differ substantially. Accordingly, in enacting anti-monopoly legislation,
China could not─even if it had so chosen─conform its competition policy
regime to a single unitary system of multilateral norms. For China,
divergence from at least some national competition regimes has been
inescapable.
This article provides an overview of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law
(“AML”) with emphasis on key areas of significant apparent divergence
from U.S. antitrust policy. Part II of this article addresses the evolution of
anti-monopoly policy in China and the United States, observing that where
differences exist, China’s AML frequently reflects principles similar to those
once embedded in U.S. antitrust policy, which have been abandoned or
modified by U.S. policymakers and courts in a sustained process of
policymaking through trial and error. In general, U.S. antitrust policy has
evolved from a system of regulation based on political, social, and
ideological considerations to one premised on modern economic principles.
Part III examines specific areas of divergence between the AML and U.S.
antitrust policy, describing how past U.S. policies, which find parallels in the
AML, were modified or abandoned over time. Particular emphasis is given
to U.S. antitrust policies which came to be seen as impediments to economic
growth, such as the antitrust treatment of agreements constituting so-called
“per se” violations (II.A), dominant market position (II.B), intellectual
property rights (II.C), and differential treatment of various industries as a
result of their relationships with government organizations (II.D, E and F).
Part IV concludes that in enacting the AML, Chinese policymakers aim to
promote economic growth and innovation. It also expresses the hope that
the U.S. experience, which was driven by the need to increase its own
economic dynamism, may serve as an abiding point of reference to China’s
policymakers.

2

(2003).

See generally Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 911
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EVOLUTION OF ANTI-MONOPOLY POLICY IN CHINA AND THE UNITED
STATES

In both China and the United States, the enactment of anti-monopoly
legislation was characterized by uncertainty and lack of consensus. It has
taken nearly a century for the United States to arrive at a workable solution.
While China will undoubtedly find its own path, as the U.S. academic Hans
B. Thorelli observed in the Preface to his magisterial history of the early
evolution of U.S. antitrust doctrine, “other nations and international bodies
considering measures to repress of control monopoly should stand to gain”
by studying the evolution of U.S. antitrust policy.3
A.

Background of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law

In 1978, China’s leaders launched the country on a program of longrun economic reform, emphasizing the introduction of market-based
principles, enterprise autonomy, private ownership, and entrepreneurialism.4
Prior to these reforms, although government-owned and run factories and
other economic units competed to achieve production quotas and other goals
set by central planners, Western-style profit-driven competition between
enterprises for markets was virtually unknown.5 After these reforms,
however, a dynamic private sector emerged in many economic sectors.6
Competition among enterprises not only became widespread, but frequently
took on such an intensity that Chinese observers characterized it as
“malignant,” “malicious,” and “excessive.”7 In 1993, China adopted an
Anti-Unfair Competition Law to place curbs on certain kinds of competitive
excesses, such as deceptive advertising, coercive sales, appropriation of
business secrets, and bribery.8 However, China’s leadership saw the need for
more comprehensive anti-monopoly legislation as a key element in the

3
HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION
vii (1955).
4
The reform program was initiated at the Eleventh Central Committee Communist Party Plenum in
December 1978.
5
Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third Way for
Competition Regime?, 24 NW J. INT’L L. AND BUS. 107, 110 (2003).
6
See Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun & Wentong Zheng, China’s Competition Policy Reforms: The AntiMonopoly Law and Beyond 10 (Stanford Inst. for Policy Research, SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 06-32,
2007), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/06-32.pdf.
7
Id. at 19.
8
Id. at 4.
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creation of the sort of sophisticated civil legal system necessary to support
the functioning of a market economy.9
China’s State Council called for enactment of Anti-Monopoly
legislation in the late 1980s, and drafting of what was to become the AntiMonopoly Law began in 1994.10 The Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”)
emerged as the principal drafting agency, although many other governmental
organizations were consulted.11 The officials involved in the drafting
consulted extensively with foreign competition officials, academics,
attorneys, and business executives. The U.S. Department of Justice, the
Federal Trade Commission, the American Bar Association, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, and other U.S. organizations reviewed and
commented extensively on various drafts of the AML and held a series of
legal exchanges and conferences with Chinese officials involved in the
drafting process.12 International bodies such as the World Bank, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International
Bar Association, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development were consulted.13 The Chinese government reviewed the draft
law with public and private sector experts in the European Union, Japan and
Korea.14 Commentators believed that these extensive consultations resulted
in substantial improvements in the law that was ultimately enacted.15

9
Between 2000 and 2004, China promulgated 94,288 laws and regulations, triple the number from
the preceding four-year period. These include a recently-enacted Property Code, a Labor Contract Law,
and individual and corporate tax codes. As of 2005, China had admitted 114,471 lawyers to practice
(compared with 6,218 in 1981), many of them with advanced degrees. Business Week observed in 2007
that “virtually every area of business life in China is now covered by a modern statute or regulation.”
China Makes Remarkable Progress in Civil Law Making, XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET] (Dec. 4, 2007),
http://en.ce.cn/National/Local/200712/05/t20071205_13816882.shtml#.
10
H. Stephen Harris, Jr., The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of the
People’s Republic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 169, 175 (2006).
11
Id. at 175-80.
12
Id. at 181.
13
Nathan Bush, The PRC Anti-Monopoly Law: Unanswered Questions and Challenges Ahead, THE
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2007, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/10/Oct07Bush10-18f.pdf.
14
Harris, supra note 10, at 181.
15
See id. at 228-9; Federal Trade Commission Chariman Deborah Platt Majoras commented in 2007
after enactment of the AML: “We have been pleased with the opportunities afforded to the U.S. antitrust
agencies to provide our views, and we have taken advantage of that through frequent high-level contacts,
including my trip to Beijing last year and a recent training program for Chinese staff involved in merger
review . . . . The Anti-Monopoly Law reflects many suggestions from the U.S. agencies, which also were
consistent with recommendations of [European Union] DG-Camp and others.” Deborah Platt Majoras,
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Fordham Law School 34th Annual Conference on
International Antitrust Law & Policy: Convergence, Conflict and Comity: The Search for Coherence in
International Competition Policy (Sept. 27, 2007).
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The U.S. Perspective on Antitrust

No country, including the United States, can claim to have a perfect
competition policy system, but the U.S. has a far longer history of
implementing anti-monopoly legislation than any other country, and its
policymakers and academics have grappled at great length with certain basic
questions that confront any government seeking to regulate competition.
The U.S. experience, including what are now generally regarded as U.S.
mistakes, has referential value for China today.
The original U.S. anti-monopoly legislation, the Sherman Antitrust
Act of 1890 (“Sherman Act”), was enacted by Congress as a response to
public agitation against “trusts” and “big business.”16 Although the Sherman
Act governed commercial relationships, professional economists were not
consulted in any meaningful way during the drafting of the law and, for
many decades, it was unclear whether antitrust had a coherent underlying
economic rationale.17 The evolution of U.S. antitrust policy is a checkered
saga in which a variety of political, social, moral and ideological
considerations gradually gave way to a rational system of commercial
regulation based on widely-accepted, modern economic principles.18
While China will pursue its own course in implementing antimonopoly policy, its policymakers must address the same fundamental
questions that have confronted U.S. antitrust policymakers since 1890:
should competition policy try to protect small businesses from competitive
pressure by large firms? What should government policy be when intense
competition results in the emergence of a single dominant enterprise? In
other words, is monopoly itself intrinsically pernicious? Should innovators
be allowed to monopolize their inventions for a limited time, or should they
be compelled to share them with actual and potential rivals? Should certain
areas of the economy be sheltered from competition law enforcement? Do
the answers to all these questions have a bearing on overall economic
growth and international competitiveness?
16
See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF, at ixxvii (Free Press 1993) (1978); see also Thomas B. Leary, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech at the
Western Economic Association: Antitrust Economics: Three Cheers and Two Challenges (July 7, 2001),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learythreecheers.htm; see also J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech at the International Bar Association Antitrust Section Conference: I Say
Monopoly, You Say Dominance: The Continuing Divide on the Treatment of Dominant Firms, is it the
Economics? 5-10 (Sept. 8, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/070908isay
monopolyba.pdf; see also William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the
Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1423-30, 1445-46 (1990).
17
Id.
18
Id.
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To the extent that the evolution of U.S. antitrust policy offers a lesson
of universal applicability, it is that competition policy can serve either as a
brake or a stimulus to economic growth. Arguably the Sherman Act and
subsequent U.S. antitrust laws were intended as much as a political
constraint on the power of big business as a system of rational economic
regulation.19 As one professor of antitrust law reportedly said, the
government should “eschew policy analysis and just keep bringing lawsuits
in order to keep businessmen ‘shook up.’”20 Not surprisingly, U.S. antitrust
policy was often criticized by economists as irrational and an impediment to
economic growth and innovation.
Fundamental reappraisals of U.S. antitrust policy have coincided with
serious economic crises. In the 1970s, the U.S. economy was struggling
with economic “stagflation,” a seemingly intractable mix of low productivity
growth, inflation, and declining rates of innovation, and antitrust policy
came under scrutiny as a contributing factor. In the preceding four decades,
U.S. antitrust policy had emphasized the curtailment and even breakup of
“dominant” firms and the imposition by the courts of severe limits on the
free exercise of intellectual property rights.21 IBM, a world-class high
technology firm, was the target of one of the largest lawsuits ever
undertaken by the federal government. In retrospect, it is recognized that as
former Deputy Assistant head of the Antitrust Division, William Kolasky,
expressed it, “pursuit of these types of antitrust policies contributed . . . to
the stagflation we experienced during the 1970s.”22
By the 1970s, an intensive intellectual reexamination of U.S. antitrust
policy, which began in the 1950s at the University of Chicago, had led new
perspectives to emerge which subsequently found expression in U.S. judicial
decisions, legislation, and antitrust policy.23 The new U.S. thinking on
19
As a former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission observed in 2001, “up to relatively recent
times there was a rigorous debate about possible alternative sources [to economic consideration] for
antitrust decisions, like dispersion of political power, wealth transfer effects, and various social
considerations.” Leary, supra note 16.
20
BORK supra note 16. Another attorney, who later was nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court,
reportedly characterized antitrust as “in the good old American tradition of the sheriff of a frontier town: he
did not sift through evidence, distinguish between suspects, and solve crimes, but merely walked the main
street and every so often pistol-whipped a few people.” Id. at 6.
21
See William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic Thinking, 14 J.
OF ECON. PERSP. 43, 50-52 (2000), in David M. Hart, Antitrust and Technological Innovation, ISSUES IN
SCI. AND TECH. (Winter 1998), http://www.issues.org/15.2/hart.htm.
22
William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Int’l Enforcement, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Address at the Tokyo America Center: The Role of Competition in Promoting Dynamic Markets
and Economic Growth (Nov. 12, 2002).
23
See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925 (1979).
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antitrust was based on economic principles rather than the social, moral, and
ideological considerations that had until then comprised important
underpinnings of U.S. antitrust policy. The new interpretations of antitrust
law “precipitated a sea change . . . . ‘In the 1960s through the 1980s
[antitrust scholars generally associated with the University of Chicago]
explained how many market structures and practices that antitrust treated
with hostility could be beneficial.’”24 One observer later commented that
“[t]he closest approximation to a pure triumph of ideas in regulatory policy
was the revolution in antitrust incited by the work [of the Chicago School
and its adherents].”25
The Chicago School perspective on antitrust rejected former notions
that “big is bad,” that any particular class of competitors (such as small
businesses) should be protected by the antitrust laws, or that innovators
should be compelled to share their inventions with competitors. The sole
purpose of antitrust, it was argued, should be to promote economic
efficiency for the benefit of consumers26—and if such benefits were
promoted by dominant or even monopoly enterprises, there should be no
inconsistency with a U.S. antitrust law. These concepts won wide
acceptance and are now firmly embedded in U.S. antitrust law and policy.
Arguably the new policies played a role in restoring robust U.S. economic
growth after the 1970s.27 In decades the U.S. witnessed the appearance of
dynamic new high technology industries, a veritable explosion in U.S.
innovation, and the emergence of an array of new world class technologyintensive firms which are the envy of other countries, including China.

24
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (2007) (quoting
GELLHORN ET. AL., ANTITRUST L. AND ECON. 105 (5th ed. 2004)).
25
BORK, supra note 16, at xii-xiii (quoting Christopher DeMuth).
26
BORK, supra note 16, at 427.
27
In Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S.,
370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)), the Supreme Court declared that the “antitrust laws . . . were enacted for the
protection of competition not competitors.” While it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine why the
Chicago School approach won such complete and comparatively rapid acceptance by U.S. courts,
policymakers, and the public, a number of analysts have pointed out that the popular hostility toward big
business that once animated the antitrust movement had largely died out, as had the antitrust movement
itself; see also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 188 et. seq. (1965); see also Daniel Scroop, A Faded Passion? Estes
Keufauver and the Sen., Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly, 5 BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY ONLINE (2007), http://www.thebhc.org/publications/BEHonline/2007/scroop.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2008);
see also William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221 (1989).
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Synopsis of China’s New Law

China’s AML was enacted August 30, 2007 and became effective on
August 1, 2008.28 Like U.S. antitrust statutes, China’s AML is short and
broadly worded, with the interpretation and application of specific
prohibitions left to be determined by subsequent implementing regulations
and decisions of the enforcement authorities.29
The AML governs “monopolistic conduct” in China and outside of
China to the extent that such conduct “eliminates or restricts competition in
China.”30 Monopolistic conduct can take three forms: (1) monopoly
agreements between undertakings;31 (2) abuse of a dominant market position
by undertakings;32 and (3) concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) that
eliminate or restrict competition.33 These three forms of “monopolistic
conduct” are prohibited and subject to civil penalties unless an exemption is
provided pursuant to the AML. There is no criminal liability under the
AML.
The stated purposes of China’s AML are to prevent and prohibit
“monopolistic conduct,” to protect “fair market competition,” to promote
“economic efficiency,” to safeguard the interests of consumers, and to
“promote the healthy development of the socialist market economy.”34
Earlier versions of China’s AML stated that the purpose of the law included
“protecting the legitimate rights and interests of undertakings [e.g.
competitors] consumers and public interest, and promoting healthy
development of the socialist market economy.”35 The final version of the
law as enacted eliminated protection of “undertakings” as a stated purpose of
the law. However, a number of provisions in the law suggest that
notwithstanding this change in Article 1, the AML may in some cases be
applied to protect one group of competitors against another in order to

28

AML, supra note 1.
The rationale of the U.S. Congress with respect to this broad approach was explained by an
eminent U.S. political scientist as follows: “[I]t is very likely that, with its broadly worded prohibition of
conspiracies in restraint of trade and of efforts to monopolize, Congress was attempting to lay down a
declaration of policy that would serve as a guide to future action in much the same flexible way as the
Constitution itself had served the country after 1787.” HOFSTADTER, supra note 27, at 199.
30
AML, supra note 1, art. 2.
31
Id. at art. 3(i).
32
Id. at art. 3(ii).
33
Id. at art. 3(iii).
34
Id. at art. 1.
35
Draft Anti-Monopoly Law transmitted to the National People’s Congress, June 7, 2006, Art. 1
(emphasis added).
29
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further industrial policy objectives.36 If this occurs it would diverge from
current U.S. practice, which is enforced to protect “competition not
competitors” and has the sole objective of maximizing consumer benefits by
promoting economic efficiency.
By its terms China’s AML makes no distinction between domestic and
foreign enterprises, and following enactment of the AML, Chinese officials
have given extensive assurances to the effect that the new AML is not aimed
at foreign firms.37 However, in the policy debates accompanying the
drafting of the AML, Chinese officials often cited the need for the AML to
serve as a foil against foreign multinationals that sought to dominate or
monopolize China’s market.38 During the course of National People’s
Congress (“NPC”) deliberations on the AML in 2006, various NPC Standing
Committee members indicated that promulgation of the AML would “strike
multinationals behavior restricting competition such as control of market

36
AML, supra note 1, art. 17(i) (a prohibition in the new law on “dominant” undertakings “buying
products at unfairly low prices” found in Article 17(i) seems intended only to protect competitors, not
consumers.); see AML, supra note 1, art. 15(v) (similarly an exemption from the prohibition on monopoly
agreements “for the purpose of mitigating a severe decrease in sales volume or excessive overstock during
economic recessions” found in Art. 15(v) can only benefit undertakings and is actually disadvantageous to
consumers.). In light of such ambiguities in the AML, it remains to be seen how Chinese policymakers will
interpret the purpose of the law.
37
MOFCOM made this point in its Foreign Investment Report 2007. Zhang Qiang of the State
Council’s Legislative Affairs Office said that “the Anti-Monopoly Law regulates mergers and acquisitions,
and is the same for domestic [enterprises] and foreign-invested [enterprises]. It does not give the domestic
[enterprises] a way out, and does not put the screw on foreign-invested [enterprises].” Guo wu yuan fa zhi
ban fan long duan fa bu ying xiang qi ye zheng dang bing gou [Legislative Affairs Office of the State
Council: Anti-Monopoly Law Does not Affect Normal Mergers and Acquisitions of Enterprises], XINHUA
WANG [XINHUA NET] (Sept. 10, 2007), http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-09/10/content_
6699043.htm (P.R.C.); see also Gong shang zong ju fan long duan shen cha bu cun zai dui wai zi de te bie
yao qiu [State Administration of Industry and Commerce: Anti-Monopoly Investigation not Specific to
Foreign Investors], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET] (Dec. 13, 2007), http://news.xinhuanet.com/
newscenter/2007-12/13/content_7244074.htm (P.R.C.); see also.Ren Siqiang, Zhuan jia fan bo shang wu
bu wai zi long duan xian xiang yi chu xian zai ge bie hang ye [Experts Refute Ministry of Commerce:
Foreign Monopoly Already Appears in Some Industries], BEIJING BUSINESS TODAY, Sept. 10, 2007
(Ministry of Finance asserts there is no foreign monopolization of domestic industries), available at
http://xinping.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/dongtai/200709/20070905076714.html; Zhuan jia cheng fan long
duan fa wu fa zhen dong guo qi long duan di wei [Experts Say AML Cannot Shake the Monopoly Position
of SOEs], Di yi cai jing ri bao [The First Financial and Economic Daily], Sept. 13, 2007 (P.R.C.) (debating
how the AML may affect state-owned monopolies).
38
China’s State Administration of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) warned in 2004: “[C]ompared
with China’s domestic enterprises, multinational companies possess great competitive advantages with
respect to technology, size, capital, etc. As a result, it is much easier for them to obtain a dominant and
even a monopoly position in the Chinese market.” Off. of Anti-Monopoly, Fair Trade Bureau, State
Admin. of Indus. and Com., Zai hua kua guo gong si xian zhi jing zheng xing wei biao xian ji dui ce
[Anticompetitive Practices of Multinational Companies in China and Countermeasures], 2004.4 Gong
shang xing zheng guan li [Biweekly of Administration for Industry and Commerce] 42, 42 (2004),
available by subscription at www.cnki.net.
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price and product quality, and abuse of market dominance . . . .”39 More
specifically cited as a concern was the “monopoly behavior of multinationals
in China, such as in computer operating systems, photographic material,
tires, network equipment, cameras, soft packaging, etc.”40
Even as Chinese leadership debated anti-monopoly legislation, some
Chinese lawmakers argued that the AML would provide a solution to a
specific issue at the time — the takeover and intellectual property rights
(“IPR”) dispute involving a domestic Chinese beverage manufacturer,
Wahaha, and the French food company Danone (known as Dannon in the
U.S.). The Wahaha chairman, Zong Qinghou, was also an NPC member and
argued in NPC testimony that special mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”)
provisions should be incorporated in the AML41 to address certain
challenges posed by foreign firms.42 Wahaha was the target of a takeover
bid by Danone which was simultaneously charging Wahaha with
inappropriate use of trademark.43 After the Wahaha discussion, another NPC
member, Li Guoguang—a member of the NPC Legal Committee and a vicepresident of the Supreme People's Court44—commented that an AML
proceeding might eventually result: “launching anti-monopoly investigations
against Danone and seeking legal measures to break its monopolized status

39
Fa yan zhai deng fan long duan fa cao an [Speech Excerpts: Draft of the Anti-Monopoly Law],
June 30, 2006 [hereinafter Speech Excerpts] (collecting excerpts of various members of the Tenth Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress, including Cong Bin and He Yicheng, quoted here),
http://cms.npc.gov.cn:87/servlet/PagePreviewServlet?siteid=1&nodeid=3064&articleid=350218&type=1 .
40
Id. (summarizing the speech of Jiang Zhuping). One member of the Standing Committee, Vice
Chairman Cheng Siwei, noted “there are two major target categories of the Anti-Monopoly Law. One is
state-owned enterprises, and the other foreign enterprises.” Id. Zheng Gongcheng noted “[a] market
economy must fight against monopoly, but at the present stage we need to protect our enterprises so as to
expand their market shares. Besides, so long as foreign trade is concerned, we need price fixing to a certain
extent to remove ruinous competition and safeguard our national interests. A balance must be properly
kept on the one hand to help our enterprises keep expanding and increasing market share, and gain
advantageous position in international competition, and on the other hand to fight monopoly.” Id.
41
Zong Qinghou, Zong Qinghou guan yu li fa xian zhi wai zi tong guo bing gou long duan wo guo
ge ge hang ye wei hu jing ji an quan de ti an [Zong Qinghou’s Proposal on Legislation Restricting Foreign
Investment from Monopolizing Various Industries in China Through Mergers and Acquisitions and
Maintaining Economic Security], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET] (Mar. 14, 2007), http://news.xinhuanet.
com/video/2007-03/14/content_5845841.htm.
42
Zheng quan shi bao [SECURITIES TIMES], Wahaha dong shi zhang Zong Qinghou ying tong guo li
fa xian zhi wai zi e yi bing gou [Chairman of Wahaha: Use Legislation to Restrict Hostile Mergers and
Acquisitions by Foreign Investment] (Mar. 15, 2007), available at http://www.p5w.net/today/
200703/t826564.htm; see Zong, supra note 41.
43
See Lan Xinzhen, Wahaha vs. Danone, 51 BEIJING REVIEW 23, 23 et. seq. (2007), available at
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/business/txt/2007-06/04/content_65226.htm.
44
Biography of Li Guoguang, National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China,
www.npc.gov.cn/npc/bmzz/falv/node_1622.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
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according to international practice could eventually occur.”45
Such
statements suggest that the AML is viewed as having special implications for
foreign firms in China.
If the AML is employed in a manner that singles out foreign
enterprises, Chinese practice will diverge from that of the United States.
The U.S. does have various statutory and regulatory schemes that treat
foreign enterprises in a differential manner, reflecting concerns such as
national security, international trade policy, and consumer protection.46
However, the sole purpose of U.S. antitrust policy is to safeguard
competition in U.S. commerce without regard to the nationality of individual
competitors.
III.

A U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON POINTS OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE AML
AND U.S. ANTITRUST POLICY

In bilateral U.S.-China discussions during the drafting phase of the
AML, U.S. officials often pointed out differences between current U.S.
antitrust policy and certain aspects of China’s emerging AML. It was less
commonly observed that China appeared to be adopting policies that closely
resembled past U.S. antitrust ideas and doctrines that have been abandoned.
Chinese policymakers may find it useful to consider what the U.S. now
regard as “wrong turns” in its own anti-monopoly experience as they begin
to define their own anti-monopoly policies.
A.

Monopoly Agreements

China’s AML prohibits “monopoly agreements” between
undertakings.47 The types of prohibited agreements are very similar to
45
Li reportedly said that “during the past decade Danone has acquired many well-known Chinese
beverage companies, including Wahaha . . .” and that “Danone is actually monopolizing China’s beverage
industry . . . .” Lan, supra note 43. Although the two parties reportedly agreed to resolve their differences
amicably, it is not clear that they have actually done so. Mure Dickie, Danone and Wahaha Agree Truce,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec 24, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/edc8a52e-b186-11dc-9777-0000779fd2ac.
html?nclick_check=1.
46
Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 codified at
50 U.S.C. § 2170 (2007) (providing authority for the President to suspend or prohibit any foreign
acquisition, merger or takeover of a U.S. corporation that is determined to threaten the national security of
the United States). For a comprehensive synopsis of U.S. federal and state laws treating foreign enterprises
in a differential manner in areas which include air and maritime transportation, insurance communications,
banking, public utilities, agriculture, energy and mining, see ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV.,
NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN-CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES: LIST OF MEASURES REPORTED FOR
TRANSPARENCY 83-91 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/46/38273182.pdf.
47
AML, supra note 1, art. 13 and 14.
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certain anticompetitive combinations that have traditionally been prohibited
under U.S. antitrust law (with the exception of the restriction on purchasing
new technologies, which is an outlier here). If applied throughout China’s
economy, as is the practice in the U.S., a number of these prohibitions are
likely to enhance competition, benefit consumers, and increase efficiency
throughout China’s economy. Specific prohibitions include: agreements
involving price fixing;48 restricting output or sales volume;49 division of
sales markets or raw materials purchasing markets;50 restrictions on
purchasing of new technology or new facilities, or the development of new
technologies or products;51 joint boycotts;52 fixing the price for resale to a
third party;53 restricting the minimum price for resale to a third party;54 and
other monopoly agreements confirmed by the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement
Authority.55
Several of the prohibitions in the AML are paralleled by prohibitions
under U.S. antitrust law, which holds that practices such as price-fixing,56
big-rigging57 and collective restraints58 on output or sales are illegal “per
se”—that is, never justified under any circumstances. U.S. courts have
dramatically curtailed the range of other commercial practices once deemed
per se illegal, however, reflecting the application of modern economic
principles.59 Beginning with a landmark Supreme Court decision in
Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,60
[T]he Court systematically went about the task of dismantling
many of the per se rules it had created in the prior fifty years,
and increasingly turned to modern economic theory to inform
its interpretation and application of the Sherman Act . . . . Rule
48

Id. at art. 13(i).
Id. at art. 13(ii).
50
Id. at art. 13(iii).
51
Id. at art. 13(iv).
52
Id. at art. 13(v).
53
Id. at art. 14(i).
54
Id. at art. 14(ii).
55
Id. at art. 13(vi) and 14(iii).
56
See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940); see also United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
57
See United States v. Misle Bus. & Equip. Co., 967 F.2d 1227, 1235 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing United
States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584, 589 (8th Cir. 1970)).
58
See United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 389-90 (1923); see also United
States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 666-669 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1014 (2000).
59
See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2007) (ruling that
resale price maintenance agreements, long regarded as illegal “per se,” are to be subject to “rule of reason”
analysis, meaning that their anticompetitive effects must be balanced against pro-competitive
considerations, and that in some cases such agreements may not be unlawful).
60
433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977).
49
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of reason analysis allows this examination of potential
efficiency rationales for challenged conduct. Although there
are exceptions, of course, the use of per se rules of automatic
illegality is now substantially reduced, replaced by a more
discriminating analysis under the rule of reason.61
China’s antitrust policymakers may wish to study recent U.S. decisions with
respect to commercial practices prohibited under Articles 14 and 15 of the
AML. Too sweeping an application of conclusive, “per se” presumptions of
illegality could penalize some forms of efficiency-enhancing commercial
behavior, to the detriment of the economy and consumers.
B.

Abuse of Dominance

An important area in which China’s AML and current U.S. antitrust
policy diverge is the treatment of enterprises with so-called “dominant”
market positions. Under U.S. law, market dominance by one company
commonly reflects that entity’s superior efficiency, innovative ability and
competitiveness. U.S. antitrust policy does not regard such enterprises as
necessarily problematic because of their market position alone, and
recognizes that their competitive acts—even if highly aggressive—are
usually pro-competition.62 Antitrust liability arises only when “specific
conduct, in a particular market situation, undermines the competitive process
by allowing a dominant firm to strengthen or preserve its market dominant
position.”63 By contrast, China’s AML subjects dominant enterprises to
heightened scrutiny and prohibits a number of commercial practices that
would be considered normal in the U.S.
Although current U.S. antitrust law does not expressly recognize the
notion of abuse of a dominant market position, the original U.S. antitrust
movement was driven by a popular antipathy to large firms that dominated
markets and, in some cases, monopolized them—sentiments similar to those
61

ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 36.
Zheng Gongcheng, member of the NPC Standing Committee, expressed this perspective as
follows: “I think we should encourage our companies to try to expand their market share. Within this
context, are companies with a dominant market position alleged monopolists? I think we should be more
cautious . . . . [W]hether an abuse exists should not be decided according to market share, but in the
manner that administrative power is exercised . . . . [A] company should not be regarded as an alleged
monopolist simply because it gets a large market share. Otherwise it would not be conducive to the
development and growth of our companies.” Speech Excerpts, supra note 39.
63
Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Address Before the University of International Business & Economics Competition Law Center
Conference on Abuse of Dominance: Theory and Practice: Some Comments on the Abuse-of-Dominance
Provisions of China’s Draft Anti-Monopoly Law 6 (July 21, 2007), http://www.usdoj.gov
/atr/public/speeches/225357.pdf.
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expressed in the recent Chinese debates over anti-monopoly legislation. The
populist U.S. politician William Jennings Bryan gave voice to what was
once a common popular sentiment when he said in 1899 that “[t]here is no
good monopoly in private hands. There can be no good monopoly in private
hands until the Almighty sends us angels to preside over the monopoly.”64
For generations this perspective found expression in U.S. antitrust policy
and judicial decisions, which were infused with subjective moral judgments
regarding large enterprises. Justice Louis Brandeis, who served on the U.S.
Supreme Court from 1916 through 1939, epitomized the view that “bigness”
in business was a “curse” which it was necessary to curb through the
application of antitrust. Brandeis believed that:
The idea of concentrating and specializing in one area . . . was
wrong. Each state, each city, each village should be partially
self-sufficient; industry and agriculture should be balanced; and
the whole trend toward urban centralization and absentee
control should be checked. The nation, in other words, should
try to recapture some of the enduring values of its rural
upbringing, recognize that Big Business and High Finance were
false gods, and get back to a simpler and more satisfying
system.
The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee commented in 1936 that
new antitrust legislation was necessary because “we must make some effort
to maintain the yeomanry in business.”
The Brandeis “big is bad” perspective found many adherents in the
courts and successive U.S. administrations from the presidency of Franklin
Roosevelt onward. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, a Roosevelt
appointee and an admirer of Brandeis who authored many antitrust opinions,
stated in 1948 that:
[S]ize can become a menace both industrial and social. It can
be an industrial menace because it creates gross inequalities
against existing or putative competitors . . . . Industrial power
should be decentralized. It should be scattered into many hands
so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the
whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability
of a few self-appointed men. The fact that they are not vicious

64
CIVIC FEDERATION OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO CONFERENCE
RESOLUTIONS, LIST OF DELEGATES, ETC. 497 (1900).
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men but respectable and social minded is irrelevant. That is the
philosophy and the command of the Sherman Act.65
Through the early 1970s U.S. antitrust embodied a hostility toward
large enterprises with strong market positions, like “dominant” enterprises.
A wide range of commercial practices were designated as “illegal per se,”
meaning that they could not be justified regardless of circumstances,66 and
courts “grew more willing to find that dominant firms had acted
improperly.”67 In a 1962 decision, the Supreme Court disallowed a merger
that would have produced a firm with a market share of 5 percent, citing
Congress’ “desire to promote competition through the protection of viable,
small, locally-owned business.”68 Thomas B. Leary, a Federal Trade
Commissioner, has observed that “[until the early 1970s] antitrust lawyers
and judges did not pay much attention to economics, and the economics they
did apply tended to be wrong.”69 Efficiencies were suspect, for example,
and monopolists were not supposed to compete very hard.70
But in the 1970s, U.S. economic growth and productivity stagnated,
while annual inflation rates reached double-digit levels. As policymakers
searched for a way out of stagflation and economic malaise, U.S.
competition policy came under withering criticism, particularly from the
Chicago economists.71 They emphasized the efficiencies and consumer
benefits that large-scale enterprises—including near or outright
monopolies—bring to an economy when they resulted from scale economies
and superior innovation and efficiency.72 One prominent critic of U.S.
antitrust policy characterized the emphasis on decentralization and
protection of small businesses as superficially attractive, but ultimately a
reflection of social and political values reflecting “a jumble of half-digested
65
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 535-36 (1948) (Douglas, J.,dissenting); see also
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 542 (1973) (Douglas, J. concurring) (Douglas
complained that the rise of large corporations transferred business decisionmaking from local entrepreneurs
to “distant cities where men on the 54th floor with only balance sheets and profit and loss statements before
them decide the fate of communities with which they have no relationship [and] responsible entrepreneurs
in counties and states are replaced by clerks.”)
66
Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 21, at 50.
67
See United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(complaining that the sole consistency he could see in Supreme Court decisions blocking mergers leading
to dominance was that “the Government [seeking to block a merger] always wins”); see also Kovacic &
Shapiro, supra note 21, at 51-52 (during this era, economists and the courts “tended to downplay
efficiencies associated with large-scale enterprises”).
68
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); see also Kovacic & Shapiro, supra
note 21, at 51.
69
Leary, supra note 16.
70
Id.
71
BORK, supra note 16.
72
Id.
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notions and mythologies” rather than rational economic thought.73 The
Chicago perspective began to win acceptance in U.S. courts, in part, because
of “a sense that U.S. firms were losing ground in international markets and
surrendering market share at home. This perception increased sensitivity to
efficiency arguments.”74
Today, a widely dispersed Chicago School perspective provides the
underpinning for U.S. antitrust policy in the competition agencies and the
courts. Big is no longer bad, nor is market dominance or even monopoly.
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) General Counsel William Blumenthal
expressed current U.S. antitrust thinking with respect to dominant firms:
Innovation, economic growth, and vigorous competition would
be stifled if the law were to punish successful market
participants who achieve a dominant or monopoly position . . . .
[E]ven firms with monopoly power are permitted to compete
aggressively on the merits, even if a collateral effect is a bad
outcome for their competitors. Competition is a rigorous
process, and it will inevitably yield both winners and losers. If
a firm is more efficient and can thereby reduce costs and
expand sales at the expense of its less-efficient competitors, our
competition laws are not infringed.75
China’s AML “abuse-of-dominance” provisions bear a closer
resemblance to U.S. antitrust policies of the 1940s through the 1960s than to
current policy. “Dominance” may be found even in situations where a firm
confronts vigorous competition. Like the old U.S. policy the AML appears
to contemplate a web of constraints that will bind large efficient enterprises
and limit an array of commercial practices that would otherwise enhance
competition and benefit consumers. In implementing the AML provisions
regarding market dominance, Chinese policymakers may wish to make
reference to the U.S. debates of the 1970s as they related to the impact of
antitrust policy on national economic dynamism.
Article 18 of China’s AML establishes parameters for use in
determining whether an undertaking has a dominant market position,

73

Id. at 54.
Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 21, at 53; see also William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox
Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 143
(1989-90).
75
William Blumenthal, General Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Government Policy for Fostering
Innovation, Remarks at the Global Forum on Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Innovation (Mar.
28, 2007).
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including market share,76 “competitive status,”77 and “financial and technical
conditions.”78 One parameter for determining dominance is “the degree of
difficulty for other business operators to enter the relevant market.”79
Similarly, Article 17 defines “dominant market position” as a market
position held by undertakings “that have the ability to control the price or
quantity of commodities or other transaction conditions in the relevant
market or block or affect the entry of other business operators into the
relevant market.”80 Another parameter, “the extent of the reliance on the
business operator by other business operators in the transactions”81 could be
applied to a wide range of other situations in which Chinese enterprises must
“rely” on technology and technical support from foreign firms holding
proprietary technology.
Article 19 of the AML establishes an arithmetic formula for use in
determining whether undertakings hold a dominant market position.
Dominance can be “presumed” if the market share of one undertaking
accounts for half of the relevant market,82 the joint market share of two
undertakings amounts to two-thirds of the relevant market,83 or the joint
market share of three undertakings amounts to three-fourths of the relevant
market.84 The law provides that “[a] business operator that has been
presumed to have a dominant market position shall not be deemed to have a
dominant market position if the operator can provide opposite evidence,”
indicating that the inference of dominance is rebuttable.85
In contrast, U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies do not believe that
presumptions of monopoly power based on market share alone are
appropriate or helpful, given the unique factors that characterize different
product markets. A firm with a large market share may face robust
competition and, as a practical matter, may not possess the power to control
76

AML, supra note 1, art. 18(i).
Id. at art. 18(i).
Id. at art. 18(iii).
79
Id. at art. 18(v).
80
Id. at art. 17. U.S. antitrust officials have expressed concern that such provisions could be applied
to a situation in which a U.S. multinational holding proprietary technology refuses to transfer it, thus
“blocking access” or making it very “difficult” (or impossible) for other undertakings to enter that product
market. Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Some
Comments on the Abuse-of-Dominance Provisions of China’s Draft Antimonopoly Law, Remarks at the
UIBE Competition Law Center Conference on Abuse of Dominance: Theory and Practice (July 21, 2007)
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/225357.htm.
81
AML, supra note 1, art. 18(iv).
82
Id. at art. 19(i).
83
Id. at art. 19(ii).
84
Id. at art. 19(iii).
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Id. at art. 19.
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prices or exclude competitors even if it seeks to do so. One U.S. antitrust
official indicated that he was “pleased” that in China’s AML “whatever the
precise percentage market share set forth in the presumption, the respondent
firm has the right . . . to rebut any presumption [of dominance].” 86
However, he said:
[T]he experience in the United States indicates that a market
share of 50 percent is too low to provide a firm with monopoly
power. We generally would not begin examining whether a
firm has a dominant market position unless it has at least a 60
or 70 percent market share. Even when a firm has such a share,
we examine the actual market situation—including barriers to
effective new entry, the likelihood of leapfrog competition, and
the durability of the high market share—to determine whether
the firm actually has the power to raise price significantly over
competitive levels.87
China’s concept of collective dominance of a market by two or three
enterprises has no parallel in U.S. antitrust doctrine and has been criticized
by U.S. competition policymakers as lacking an economic rationale. One
U.S. official comments that only one scenario exists under which three firms
with a large joint market share might pose a collective threat to
competition—when all three collude to limit competition—a scenario which
can easily be addressed through the application of Articles 13 and 14 of the
AML, which prohibit monopoly agreements.88 The presumption of
collective “dominance” by three firms, he said “is unclear and confusing,
and is likely to harm, rather than promote, competition in Chinese
markets.”89
Commercial practices which constitute prohibited “abuses” of a
dominant position are itemized in Article 17 of China’s AML, and are
defined in sweeping and general terms.90 U.S. Federal Trade Commissioner
Pamela Jones Harbour commented in 2006 with respect to these designated

86
Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Some
Comments on the Abuse-of-Dominance Provisions of China’s Draft Antimonopoly Law, Remarks at the
UIBE Competition Law Center Conference on Abuse of Dominance: Theory and Practice (July 21, 2007),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/225357.htm.
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“abuses” that “[e]ach example of abusive conduct is a type of conduct that
[under U.S. law] will usually constitute legitimate competitive behavior.”91
Article 17, section (i) of the AML cites as an abuse of a dominant
market position “selling products at unfairly high prices or buying products
at unfairly low prices.”92 A senior U.S. antitrust official recently commented
on this provision:
I do not believe that high pricing is an appropriate subject for
antitrust enforcement. High pricing, standing alone, does not
harm the competitive process; if anything, it serves as a signal
and an inducement for other firms to enter the market . . . .
Second-guessing the unilateral, non-exclusionary pricing
decisions of dominant firms will lead to price regulation by the
government, which is not consistent with the market-oriented
goals of competitive laws.93
The proscription on selling products at “unfairly high prices” could be
applied, among other things, to IP licensing fees that are deemed “too high.”
The prohibition on buying products at unfairly low prices could also be
applied to inhibit a range of normal pricing practices commonly found in a
competitive market, such as the use of bulk purchasing power to bargain for
lower prices94—a practice which U.S.-based retailers like Wal-Mart use to
secure dramatically lower prices for consumers.
A second form of prohibited abuse is “[s]elling products at prices
below cost without any justification.”95 Normally, low prices are an
indicator of competition, which benefits consumers. U.S. antitrust doctrine
recognizes that in extremely rare cases a dominant firm may price below
cost for a sustained period in order to drive competitors out of the market,
then raise prices to monopoly levels—so-called “predatory pricing.”96
However, the U.S. competition agencies have concluded that almost all
below-cost pricing has a non-predatory explanation, such as clearing out
inventory, enticing consumers to try new products, or meeting competition
from other firms.97 Their recommendation to China with respect to this
91
Pamela Jones Harbour, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Adoption of Trade Regulations in
China, Scope and Effect: An American’s View, Remarks at the New York State Bar Ass’n International
Law and Practice Section, Shanghai, China, 6 (Oct. 20, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/harbour/061020nysbaintllawpracticesection.pdf).
92
AML, supra note 1, art. 17(i).
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Masoudi, supra note 86.
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provision is that it should find that below cost pricing is “without
justification” only in the narrow range of circumstances in which prices are
below marginal cost and there is a likelihood that the firm in question will be
able to recover lost profits later by raising prices after driving competitors
out of the market.98
A third form of prohibited abuse is “refusing to transact with a trading
party without any justifiable causes.”99 This proscription could be applied to
any situation in which an undertaking decides—for whatever reason—it
does not wish to enter into a commercial relationship with another
undertaking, whether with respect to research and development (“R&D”),
distribution, sales joint manufacturing, or cross-licensing of technology.100
The stakes are potentially very large if the provision is interpreted to apply
to the unilateral refusal to license IPR, which is regarded as a fundamental
right under U.S. law.101 A 2007 report issued jointly by the U.S. Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission stated the agencies’
conclusions with respect to unilateral refusals to license patents:
[Supreme Court] jurisprudence support[s] the traditional
understanding that the unilateral right to refuse to [license] a
patent is a core part of the patent grant. Antitrust liability for
mere unilateral, unconditional refusals to license patents will
not play a meaningful part in the interface between patent rights
and antitrust protections. Antitrust liability for refusals to
license competitors would compel firms to reach out and
affirmatively assist their rivals, a result that is “in some tension
with the underlying purpose of antitrust law.102
“Restricting their trading party so that it may conduct deals
exclusively with themselves or with the designated business operators
without any justifiable causes” is a prohibited abuse.103 This prohibition
could be applied to prohibit a wide variety of commercial practices, such as
exclusive distribution arrangements and cross-licensing of technology.
98

Id.
AML, supra note 1, art. 17 (iii).
A specific example given by SAIC in 2004 of this type of “abuse” was a U.S. multinational, the
largest manufacturer of network equipment in the world, which was not willing to authorize any other
company to use its private protocols for which it owned patent rights or business secrets. Off. of AntiMonopoly, supra note 38 at 42.
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The AML prohibits dominant firms from “[i]mplementing tie-in sales
or imposing other unreasonable trading conditions at the time of trading
without any justifiable causes.”104 This provision does not prohibit tying
agreements but requires that they be “justifiable” and not involve
“unreasonable” terms. Interpreted most broadly, this provision could be
applied to prohibit virtually any agreement that in some way links the sale of
a product subject to IPR protection with other products, such as sale of a
whole computer with proprietary components. A narrower interpretation
might approximate U.S. practice, which considers both anticompetitive
effects and the efficiencies arising out of a tying agreement. U.S.
competition agencies are more likely to challenge a tying arrangement if: 1)
the seller has market power with respect to the tied product; 2) the
agreement has an adverse affect on competition in the relevant market for
the tied product; and 3) the efficiency effects do not outweigh the adverse
affects on competition.105
The AML prohibits dominant firms from “[a]pplying discriminatory
treatment on trading prices or other trading conditions to their trading parties
with equal standing without any justifiable causes.”106 A 2004 survey by
China’s State Administration of Industry and Commerce suggests invoking
this provision against multinationals that price their products differently in
various geographic markets around the world.107
Finally, there is a catchall category that embraces “[o]ther forms of
abusing the dominant market position as determined by the Anti-Monopoly
Law Enforcement Agency.”108 This language vests the enforcement
authority with discretion to identify other commercial practices that are to be
deemed “abusive.”
In 2006, Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, reviewed the practices
defined as “abuses” by China’s then-draft AML. He stated:
Refusals to deal, exclusive dealing, tying and price
discrimination all can be used for pro-competitive, efficiencyenhancing reasons and in only very limited circumstances will
have anticompetitive effects, even when used by a firm with a
dominant market position. Indeed, practices such as these are
very common in highly competitive markets, reflecting that
104

Id. at art. 17(v).
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such distribution methods can reduce costs and improve
efficiency. Therefore, it is important that these practices not be
presumed to be anticompetitive, either in the law or by the antimonopoly enforcement agency in implementing the law. These
practices should be viewed as unlawful only if, after a detailed
analysis of the conduct, the market, and proffered business
justifications, it is determined that the conduct harms
competition by creating, maintaining or strengthening the
monopoly power of the dominant firm and that the conduct
makes economic sense to the firm only because of its
anticompetitive effects.109
C.

Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation

An aspect of competition policy closely related to market dominance
is the treatment of IPR, such as patents and copyrights, which confer upon
the owners a monopoly of limited duration during which to exploit their
inventions. Because competition laws commonly prohibit or restrict
monopolies, the question commonly arises how the seeming inconsistencies
between IPR and competition rules are to be reconciled. China’s AML does
not, by its terms, clarify how China will address this question other than to
state that the AML will not apply to the exercise of IPR except when IPR is
“abused” to “eliminate or restrict competition.”110 However, statements by
Chinese officials have raised concerns that the AML will be applied in a
manner which will substantially curtail the rights of IPR holders.111 This
would represent a major and significant divergence from current U.S.
antitrust policy. Moreover, the historic U.S. experience with respect to the
antitrust treatment of IPR suggests that substantial curtailment of IPR by
rigorous application of the AML would undermine a key long range Chinese
policy objective, the promotion of innovation in the Chinese economic
system.
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Article 55 of the AML provides that it “shall not apply to conduct of
business operators to exercise their intellectual property rights according to
the laws and administrative regulations on intellectual property rights.”112
However, it states that “this law shall apply to the conduct of business
operators to eliminate or restrict market competition by abusing their
intellectual property rights.”113 “Abuse” of IPR is not further defined, but
the provisions of Article 17 of the AML itemizing the forms of “abusing the
dominant position” include “selling . . . at unfairly high” prices,114 which
could be applied to IP licensing fees, and “refusing to trade with a trading
party without any justifiable causes,”115 which could be applied to instances
of refusal of an IPR holder to license proprietary technologies to
competitors.116
Precisely what constitutes an “abuse” of IPR may be clarified by the
issuance of AML-specific intellectual property guidelines by the Chinese
government. In the interim, however, a combination of administrative
actions, pending legal changes, and statements by Chinese officials have
heightened foreign concerns with respect to compulsory licensing of
patented technologies used for national standards, the setting of royalty
rates, and abuse of IPR generally. For example, in 2003 and 2004, the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) undertook a survey
and held a series of conferences regarding anticompetitive conduct of
foreign multinationals and published certain of its findings in its official
journal.117 In the journal, SAIC expressed concern that there were no laws
or regulations “enacted in China to deal with such practices as . . . refusal to
deal through abuse of intellectual property . . .”118 indicating that their
“technological advantages” were “the most important advantages of
multinationals.”119 SAIC gave a specific example of an IPR-related “abuse”
112
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whereby a U.S. multinational, “the largest manufacturer of network
equipment in the world,” was “not willing to authorize any other company to
use its ‘private protocols’ for which it owned patent rights or business
secrets.”120 Hence, SAIC urged swift enactment of the AML “to complete
the competition law system and stop the anticompetitive practices of
multinational companies in a timely manner.”121
In 2005, Shang Ming, Director of Treaty and Law, MOFCOM,
reportedly stated that:
[T]he most extreme [examples of] anti-competitive behaviors of
multinationals against Chinese enterprises are seen in the abuse
of intellectual property rights. But the Anti-Monopoly Law has
not been promulgated in China so there is no effective measure
to restrict these behaviors . . . . As multinationals usually own
several core technologies or core patents, Chinese enterprises
have to ask for help in their manufacturing procedures. And
some multinationals use their advantageous position to place
restrictions on their licensing of patents to Chinese
enterprises.122
In 2007, an official from the Ministry of Information and Industry
(“MII”) reportedly spoke in other contexts of breaking “the intellectual
property monopoly of foreign [companies]” as it related to royalty ratesetting, an area of frequent tension between foreign IPR holders and
potential Chinese users of that intellectual property.123 The official echoed a
statement by another MII official just months earlier who reportedly said
“[we] oppose the monopoly through intellectual property standards . . . .”124
The provisions in China’s AML addressing market dominance and
IPR appear to comprise parts of a broader national effort to promote
120
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“indigenous” innovation in China by domestic individuals and enterprises.
The government has implemented a number of “top down” type measures to
foster indigenous innovation, such as government funding for R&D, the
establishment of incentive measures to reward indigenous innovation, and
the encouragement of foreign technology transfer and absorption by
domestic enterprises.125 The numerous statements by Chinese policymakers
about the role of the AML in China’s national innovation effort indicate a
strong intention to break “foreign monopolies” on existing technologies
protected by patents and other forms of intellectual property rights. But the
experience of the United States—a nation with a strong record of
innovation—raises questions about the soundness of an innovation policy
predicated, in significant part, on curtailing the commercial latitude and IPR
of innovators, whether foreign or domestic.
The Founding Fathers of the United States placed such importance on
the promotion of innovation in the new republic that they expressly provided
for the protection of intellectual property rights in the Constitution. Article I
grants Congress the authority to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”126 Thomas Jefferson,
himself an inventor who was extensively involved in the administration of
the early U.S. patent system, commented that “the issue of patents for new
discoveries has given a spring to invention beyond my conception.”127
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American inventors
produced a stream of revolutionary technologies—the steamboat, the
mechanical reaper, the telegraph, the electric light, the telephone, the
airplane—and the patent system afforded them the opportunity to reap the
rewards of their genius.
125
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But in the early twentieth century the rise of big businesses—many of
which had large patent portfolios—became the source of considerable public
concern. Big business, it was feared, not only would not innovate but would
crush the small enterprises that were idealized as the true American
wellsprings of invention. President Woodrow Wilson gave voice to a
common sentiment when he warned that “monopoly . . . always checks
development” and that the advent of large firms with monopoly power put at
risk the traditional American genius that had given rise to inventions.128 He
said that “[th]e instinct of monopoly is against novelty, the tendency of
monopoly is to keep in use the old thing, made in the old way,” he said.129
Calling for curbs on monopoly, he asked, “who can say what patents now
lying, unrealized, in secret drawers and pigeonholes, will come to light, or
what new inventions will astonish and bless us, when freedom is
restored?”130
These popular and political anxieties manifested in U.S. antitrust
policy. “During much of the twentieth century, the courts, antitrust
enforcers, and antitrust practitioners viewed intellectual property with deep
skepticism.”131 Between 1930 and roughly the mid-1970s, antitrust concerns
commonly overrode patent rights in court decisions. “[During this] ‘antipatent’ era . . . U.S. policy-makers and regulators remained largely
suspicious of the power of big business. The courts generally viewed
patents as automatic sources of monopoly power and measures were taken to
weaken patent rights”132—a perspective not entirely dissimilar to that of
Chinese officials who have expressed recent concerns about “monopoly” of
intellectual property by multinational enterprises. Most U.S. patents that
became the subject of litigation during the “anti-patent” era were declared
invalid, and one Supreme Court Justice observed in 1949 that “the only
patent that is valid is one this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”133
The anti-patent stance of the U.S. competition agencies culminated in the
promulgation of the Justice Department’s so-called “Nine No-Nos,” setting
forth fee arrangements and contractual restraints that could not be legally
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incorporated in technology licensing agreements.134 Some of the Nine NoNos are similar to the practices currently cited as “abuses of dominance” in
China’s AML.135
The hostility of U.S. antitrust policy toward IPR in the mid-twentieth
century—particularly in the hands of “big business”—was criticized by
contemporary analysts. In a 1952 study the economist John Kenneth
Galbraith observed that “the showpieces of American industrial progress”
were primarily “dominated by a handful of large firms,” and that “the
foreign visitor, brought to the United States by the Economic Cooperation
Administration, visits the same firms as do the attorneys of the Department
of Justice in their search for monopoly.”136 In 1966, Richard Hofstadter
rejected as a “curiosity” the Wilsonian notion that big firms restricted
innovation, observing that “today the public needs no persuading that it is
the large corporations, with their programs of research, that are
technologically progressive.”137 Even Senator Estes Kefauver, long one of
the most prominent critics of “big business,” conceded in 1958 “that the
wealth and resources of Du Pont made possible the long years of research
from which came such developments as cellophane and nylon.”138
However, a change in U.S. antitrust policy with respect to IPR did not
occur until the stagflation of the 1970s led to a reassessment of the
underpinnings of the U.S. economic system. The Chicago School’s critique
of U.S. antirust policy placed a major emphasis on what was seen as a
misguided application of antitrust rules to IPR. The Chicago economists
encouraged a reappraisal of the U.S. patent system due to a “general concern
134
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[sic]. During this era the Antitrust Division had a section devoted to attacking IP licensing practices that
we routinely applaud today. This was the era of the ‘Nine No Nos’ during which we applied per se rules to
many licensing practices.” H. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Competition and
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about industrial stagnation and a lack of significant technological
innovations.”139 Their views were reinforced by the findings of an advisory
committee established by President Carter to examine U.S. innovation
policy, which concluded that “diminished patent incentive” was contributing
to U.S. economic stagnation.140
Changing attitudes were reflected in a series of court decisions and
policy shifts in the 1980s that fundamentally reoriented the relationship
between U.S. antitrust and IP protection policies. Two critical Supreme
Court decisions, Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Diamond v. Diehr
significantly expanded the scope of patentable subject matter, with the
Supreme Court declaring that patentable subject matter can “include
anything under the sun that is made by man.”141 Also in 1981, the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) renounced the “Nine No-Nos” governing IP
licensing, articulating efficiency-enhancing justifications for the same
licensing practices that had been treated as per se illegal under the Nine NoNos.142 In 1981, a DOJ official outlined how thorough economic analysis
could result in a finding of pro-competitive effects of certain licensing
practices whereas incomplete analysis might draw opposite conclusions.143
The following year Congress created the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, vesting in it exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals of federal
district court decisions involving patents. The creation of this new appellate
court is seen as a watershed in the history of the U.S. patent system because
it has upheld patent validity with far more consistency than was the case
with U.S. courts in the “anti-patent” era.
Finally, in 1988, the DOJ issued the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines
for International Operations, which reinforced its earlier statements with
respect to the antitrust/IPR interface. These were updated in 1995 and 2007,
but all versions have committed the competition agencies to the continued
and extensive use of the rule of reason in IPR cases, ensuring that any
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antitrust challenges to patents and other IPR will be subject to extensive
economic analysis.
These changes in U.S. antitrust policy had the effect of significantly
broadening the exclusive rights of innovators to exploit their inventions—
which arguably fueled the dramatic growth of technology-intensive U.S.
industries in subsequent decades. With respect to what were in 1980
“nascent industries such as semiconductors, software, and biotech,” the
Supreme Court was “a driving force behind a series of legal precedents and
legal reforms” that extended more secure patent coverage to new life forms,
semiconductor designs, software programs, business methods, and
nanotechnologies.144 Companies in these industries that did not exist or
were relatively obscure in 1980 have grown to become world leaders in their
fields. In certain cases, they are the very “dominant” foreign enterprises that
worry Chinese policymakers today. The relationship between the change in
U.S. IPR policy and the success of these industries was direct. In the case of
biotechnology, for example, the 1980 Supreme Court held in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty that biological inventions could be protected by patents. This
had dramatic, long-term consequences. Representatives of the biotech
industry “generally credited the [Supreme] Court’s decision in Chakrabarty
as the beginning of their industry without which genetic engineering would
not have made nearly as much progress.”145 Robert P. Taylor, an expert on
intellectual property law, testified in 2002 on behalf of the American Bar
Association Section of International Property Law that “[w]ithout patent
protection, the venture capital which has been critical in fostering the
[biotech] industry would not have been available. This entire industry, in
which the United States is the clear leader, would have languished.”146
Today U.S. antitrust authorities recognize that innovation itself is one
of the most pro-competitive forces in an economy, and that curbs on the
exclusive rights of innovators deter innovation itself.
If the inventor [in a discovery] commits funds and the
investment fails, it absorbs the entire loss; it does not receive
any subsidy from its competitors. But if the investor commits
funds and the investment succeeds, it must now share the
benefits with its competitors. An asymmetrical system of this
type discourages entrepreneurial risk-taking, encourages freeriding, and becomes what one of our commentators has called
144
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“an insurance policy for laggards.” To assure that investment
and innovation are not discouraged, competitors must be
confident in advance that they will not be required to share their
successful assets with competitors.147
D.

Government Administered Industries

Until its economic reforms, China’s economy was completely
dominated by state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), and the government
exercised pervasive regulatory control over the conditions of competition,
including pricing, output volume, and market entry and exit. With the
progress of these reforms, a dynamic private sector has emerged in many
parts of the economy and many former state enterprises have been
privatized. However, a number of key sectors remain dominated by SOEs,
and administrative authorities are still extensively involved in regulating
competition in a number of industries. The AML makes reference to these
government-administered industries,148 but the extent to which the terms of
the AML will be fully applied to them remains uncertain. Wang Xiaoye, a
prominent Chinese legal scholar and member of the Anti-Monopoly Law
Working Committee, warns that “the law provides no answer as to who will
have priority when conflicts arise between industrial policy and antimonopoly legislation . . . . [This should be clarified and] specifics of
implementing regulations should be released as soon as possible.”149
Article 7 of the AML provides that “[t]he State shall protect the lawful
business activities of undertakings in industries that are controlled by the
State-owned economy . . . . [The] State shall supervise and control the price
of commodities and services provided by these undertakings to protect the
interest of consumers and facilitate technical progress.”150 SOEs are
directed to “be self-disciplined” and not to “harm the interest of the
consumer from a controlling or exclusive dealing position.”151 This
provision appears to contemplate a continuation of the current practice of
government-administered pricing in many SOE-dominated sectors. It is
unclear from this provision whether SOEs are subject to, exempt from, or
147
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partially subject to the AML. They are not included in the list of exemptions
expressly set forth in Article 15, and Article 7 states that SOEs shall operate
“in accordance with the law.” However it is not clear whether this is a
reference to the AML, to the industry-specific laws that commonly govern
SOE-dominated sectors (e.g., Energy Law, Electricity Law, Air Law,
Telecommunications Law, Insurance Law) or to both the AML and such
other laws.
Read together with the remainder of the AML, Article 7 suggests that
there will be, in effect, two competition policy regimes: one characterized by
government oversight and regulation of enterprise behavior pursuant to the
AML and the other by direct government administration of pricing and
enterprise conduct in SOE-dominated sectors pursuant to Article 7 and
industry-specific laws. It is entirely possible that the SOE-dominated sectors
will be subject to more lenient treatment under the AML than those sectors
in which foreign enterprises play a more important role.
There is little parallel between China’s AML provisions regarding
SOEs and U.S. antitrust practice, because state-owned enterprises do not
play a significant role in the U.S. economy overall. However, the
government-owned U.S. Postal Service (USPS) holds a statutory monopoly
on the delivery of non-overnight first-class mail, outbound international
mail, and the placement of mail in private mailboxes.152 USPS has long
been criticized for inefficiency and constantly increasing prices, and some
argue that private delivery services have performed better in areas they have
been allowed to enter, such as parcel and express mail services. Few, if any,
economists would contend that the U.S. economy would benefit from the
extension of similar statutory monopolies to other sectors of the economy.153
Some Chinese observers have embraced a similar perspective and
called for the AML to be applied fully to SOEs. During the debates on the
AML, some NPC members pointed out that SOE monopolies harm
consumers and should be brought under AML disciplines, with high rates
charged by the telecommunications industry singled out as a particular
concern. “Governmental agencies should stand up for the whole society and
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strengthen regulation of SOEs,” said one NPC Standing Committee member
during the debates.154
Articles 8 and 32 through 37 of the AML establish constraints on
anticompetitive acts by administrative authorities and “organizations
authorized with administrative powers of public affairs by laws and
regulations.”155
The language regarding organizations vested with
administrative power was added in the final version of the AML and
presumably would encompass trade associations, standards-setting working
groups, and other non-state actors vested with delegated regulatory authority.
Because of the substantial potential for anticompetitive, restrictive and
nontransparent actions by such quasi-public entities, this change represents
an improvement over earlier drafts of AML legislation.
The sections governing administrative monopolies consist entirely of
a listing of prohibited actions.156 The AML does not subject administrative
monopolies to the jurisdiction of AML enforcement authorities. There are
no specific penalties established for violation of the prohibitions. Article 51
simply provides that administrative agencies and organizations vested with
authority that commit abuses “shall be admonished by the superior
authorities,” and that “individuals who are directly responsible shall be
punished in accordance with law.”157 No procedures are established for
parties that are adversely affected by the abuse of administrative powers to
seek relief. Thus, it is unclear what effect these new safeguards will actually
have in the market.
These concerns led Wang Xiaoye, one of the framers of the AML, to
warn that under this provision, “the anti-monopoly law is like a tiger without
154
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teeth when dealing with administrative monopolies. The combating of
monopolies cannot be left only to the higher authorities.”158
Although far less of the U.S. economy was ever dominated by SOEs,
as recently as the 1980s many U.S. industries were heavily regulated by
government agencies that exercised control over basic decisions such as
pricing, output, and market entry and exit. In some cases, government
agencies held statutory authority that enabled them to authorize industry
price-stabilization measures and other cartel-type arrangements. In the late
1970s and 1980s, recognizing that this type of industry regulation not only
harmed consumers but acted as a drag on economic growth, Congress
enacted legislation deregulating a number of major industries, including air,
rail, and motor carrier transportation.159 The power of government agencies
to authorize anticompetitive agreements has largely been abolished, and the
deregulated sectors are now subject to U.S. antitrust enforcement.
Deregulation, and the increased competition that has resulted, have
been important factors underlying the increased dynamism and rates of
productivity growth that have taken place in the U.S. economy in recent
decades.160 One comprehensive study of the empirical evidence on the U.S.
post-regulation experience concluded that “[s]ociety has gained at least $36$46 billion (1990 dollars) annually from deregulation,” principally in the
U.S. transportation (airlines, railway, road freight) sector, but also in the
telecommunications, cable television, stock broking, and natural gas
industries.161 The gains achieved through regulatory reform reportedly
resulted in an approximately seven to nine percent improvement in GNP.162
Each industry examined dramatically improved productivity and achieved
real operating cost reductions ranging from twenty-five to seventy-five
percent, with consumers being the primary beneficiaries, but with labor and
producers also experiencing a net benefit.163 There is little question that full
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application of the AML to China’s SOE-dominated sectors and
administrative monopolies would bring similar benefits to China’s economy.
E.

Regional Blockades and Other Restrictions

The AML prohibits a variety of restrictions by regional governments
to limit trade and investment originating outside the regions themselves.164
The provision is a response to measures that have been taken by provincial
governments to restrict the inflow of products from other regions that
compete with local enterprises.165 The prohibition on regional blockades
arguably serves a function similar to the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which has been applied to strike down state laws that provide
for “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that
benefits the former and burdens the latter.”166 This application of the
Commerce Clause has been recognized as an essential element of the
commercial integration of the U.S. economy.167 If the AML is to play a
similar role in China, it will be necessary for the central government to
ensure and clarify that these provisions override restrictive measures
employed by the governments of Provinces, Autonomous Regions, and
Municipalities. Zheng Gongcheng, a member of the NPC Standing
Committee, commented that “[t]he formation of a unified market nationwide
might be the [most] pressing issue to be addressed by this [Anti-Monopoly]
Law.”168
F.

Exemptions

Article 15 of the AML provides exemptions from the basic prohibition
on monopoly agreements set forth in Articles 13 and 14 “for the purpose of
mitigating a severe decrease in sales volume or excessive overstock during
economic recessions.”169
This exemption appears to permit price
stabilization agreements and joint production and curtailment agreements
164
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during recessions. The Law also provides for exemptions “for the purpose
of safeguarding the legitimate interests in foreign trade and foreign
economic cooperation.”170 By apparently permitting what are arguably the
most common types of cartel agreements, Article 15 significantly weakens
the pro-competitive potential of the new law.
The U.S. has a number of statutory exemptions to the antitrust law,
many of them enacted in the first half of the twentieth century.171 A recent
review of U.S. antitrust policy by the Antitrust Modernization Commission,
a body created by Congress to determine whether the antitrust laws should
be modernized in light of our global, high-tech economy, concluded that
“statutory immunities from the antitrust law should be disfavored.” The
Commission found that exemptions should be granted rarely, when a clear
case has been made that the case for the exemption outweighs the benefits of
competition.172
G.

Trade Associations

Article 11 of the AML provides that “[t]rade associations shall
strengthen the self-discipline of undertakings within their industries and
guide the undertakings to compete in accordance with the law and maintain
the order of market competition.”173 It is unclear whether this provision is
intended to encourage industry associations to undertake actions that protect
consumers or whether it contemplates a role for the associations in
maintaining “market order” and restricting competition. Article 16 of the
AML states that trade associations “shall not organize undertakings within
their industries to engage in monopolistic conduct prohibited by [Chapter II
Monopoly Agreements],”174 and Article 46 provides for the levying of fines
and revocation of registration with respect to violations by trade
associations.175 However, as noted, Article 15 of the AML exempts many
forms of collective activity from the general prohibition on monopoly
agreements, including recession cartels.176
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Since the 1990s, Chinese trade associations, encouraged by the
government, have played a major role in facilitating industry-wide price
stabilization measures, suggesting that notwithstanding enactment of the
AML, they will continue to play such a role.177 Many of China’s trade
associations evolved out of the old you guan bumen (“departments-incharge”), and are staffed with former ministry officials. They play an
important role in carrying out sectoral government policies. Article 11, like
Article 7 regarding SOEs, appears to contemplate a continuing government
administrative role with respect to enterprise decisions on matters such as
pricing and output levels.
In the United States, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the
federal government and some state governments experimented with
authorizing trade associations to promulgate and enforce industry codes
limiting competition, effectively suspending the operation of the antitrust
laws.178 One rationale was that restraints on competition were necessary to
protect farmers, small businesses and ailing sectors like coal and oil.179
Pursuant to federal legislation and parallel state and municipal laws,
barbershops, beauty shops, shoe repair shops, bowling alleys, dry-cleaning
establishments, and laundries, adopted minimum-price rules. Used-car
dealers adopted rules forbidding sales below a “list” price, and similar rules
were adopted throughout much of the U.S. economy.180 Government and
business spokesmen adopted a new lexicon: “competition” became
“economic cannibalism”; antitrust advocates were “corporals of disaster”;
and the pejorative term “chiseler” came into common use in reference to
firms that undercut the minimum prices established by industry association
codes.181
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Although the U.S. industry codes were often styled as “procompetitive,” their basic purpose was anticompetitive, “promot[ing] scarcity
and thus balanc[ing industry] output and demand, regardless of the
dislocations that such action might bring in other areas of the economy.”
Their net effect was to “restrict production, prevent change, hold up prices,
and bilk the consumer.”
This system of “government-sponsored
cartelization” not only did not end the Depression, but arguably deepened
and extended it. In his seminal study of U.S. Depression-era antitrust
policies, the political economist Ellis W. Hawley observed with respect to
the impact of the codes that “[i]n the ‘sick’ industries and the transportation
field the typical [industry self-regulation] program was designed to arrest
technological innovation and protect inefficiency, not to encourage
economic progress or ease the transition to newer, cheaper and more
productive methods of providing the necessary goods and services.”182
In the worst case, Article 11 of the AML could foster the spread of
arrangements in China that resemble U.S. Depression-era industry codes. In
its journal article on the anticompetitive practices of foreign multinationals,
SAIC envisioned a restrictive role for China’s trade associations as they
interfaced with foreign companies: “[We shall] help and guide the
establishment of industrial organizations and associations in the industries
which involve investment of multinationals, and effectively supervise the
market competition behaviors of multinationals in these industries through
industrial organizations and associations . . . .”183 Market regulation of this
kind by government-sanctioned industry associations would likely produce
results similar to those experienced in the U.S. in the 1930s: scarcity, high
prices, fewer choices for consumers, and the inhibition of innovation.
H.

Review of Concentrations

Article 3 of the AML prohibits “concentrations” of undertakings that
have or are likely to have the effect of eliminating or restricting
competition.184 Article 5 provides that “[u]ndertakings may implement
concentration in accordance with the law through fair competition and
voluntary combination to expand their business scale and to improve their
market competitiveness.”185 Articles 20 through 31 establish procedures by
which Chinese authorities can review prospective mergers and other
182
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combinations and disapprove them if the transaction “has or may have the
effect of restricting or eliminating competition.”186 A rule-of-reason type
standard is established for review of concentrations, and a problematic
transaction may not necessarily be disapproved if “the undertakings can
prove that the positive effects of such concentration on competition
obviously outweigh the negative effects or that the concentration is in the
public interest.”187
Chinese policymakers have expressed concern that in many domestic
industrial sectors, Chinese enterprises are too small to achieve the economies
of scale necessary to compete internationally on an equal footing with large
foreign enterprises. For this reason, it is unlikely that the AML will be
applied to domestic combinations in an excessively rigorous manner,
particularly if there is little or no likelihood that a given combination will
create conditions of monopoly or otherwise reduce competition.
Foreign comment on the AML merger review provision has focused
largely on the extent to which Chinese government review of a merger
outside of China would be triggered. The concern was that the draft AML
established standards pursuant to which notification might be required with
respect to mergers elsewhere in the world with limited or even no impact on
China.188 The final version of the AML eliminates statutory thresholds,
stipulating when a prior notification of a merger or acquisition is required.
Article 21 now states simply that notification will be required pursuant to a
“threshold of notification” to be stipulated at a future date by the State
Council.189 This defers but does not eliminate concerns that the notification
thresholds will be set too low, giving rise to unnecessarily burdensome
notification requirements for foreign multinationals that are active in
acquiring firms around the world.
U.S. antitrust policy is designed to “ensure that transactions have an
adequate nexus with the United States by exempting certain foreign
acquisitions from notification requirements.”190 In addressing U.S. concerns
over potential Chinese notification thresholds under the AML in 2006, a U.S.
DOJ official pointed out that in the U.S., acquisition of stock in a foreign
company is exempt if the foreign firm has less than $57 million in assets in
186
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the U.S. or less than $57 million in sales in the U.S. He indicated that
acquisition of stock by one foreign company in another is exempt from
review if the block of stock concerned does not give the acquiring company
a 50% or more interest, and that combinations are also exempt if both parties
are foreign, the value of the transaction is less that $227 million, and their
combined sales and combined assets in the U.S. are both $125 million.191
Chinese policymakers may wish to adopt similar guidelines to ensure that
review is not required of combinations that have little or no nexus with
China.
I.

National Security Review

Article 31 provides that, with respect to acquisition of domestic
undertakings by “foreign capital” as well as “other circumstances involving
the concentration of foreign capital,” if national security is concerned, an
examination shall be conducted “according to the relevant regulations of the
State.”192 This provision contemplates a security-related policy review of
acquisitions comparable to the scrutiny given inward foreign investment in
the U.S. by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(“CFIUS”).193 The addition of Article 31 to the AML has created some
confusion as to whether a new national security review process has been
created. As a practical matter, such review occurs already with respect to
foreign direct investment, and transactions with national security
implications are likely to be continued under separate procedures as
before.194
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The implications of this provision, if any, with respect to inward
foreign investment remain to be seen. Most countries, including the United
States, have rules providing for screening of inward foreign investment on
national security grounds. The extent to which such screening constitutes a
significant impediment to inward foreign direct investment depends on the
extent to which a particular government associates various industries with
the concept of “national security.” Since its entry into the WTO, China has
permitted extensive inward foreign investment in high-technology industries
that some other countries have regarded as sensitive. However, there have
been recent signs that the government may be moving toward a more
expansive view of national security and that the AML may play a role in
addressing national security concerns.
One recent example involved the soybean processing industry. A
State Council official reportedly suggested during an interview with
reporters and during a trade conference that the soybean industry might be
protected in various ways, including through the AML, on the basis of
national security. “The soybean industry is related to the national economy
and the people’s livelihood. It would have an adverse impact on China’s
macroeconomic control and market stability, it would be a hidden trouble for
China’s foodstuffs too, if [the soybean industry] were completely
monopolized by foreign investment . . . .”195 The same official was quoted
elsewhere as suggesting that China should “formulate a development plan in
the soybean industry . . . . First, foreign capital is forming a monopoly in the
soybean processing industry in China . . . . In the end, Cheng Guoqiang
suggests that we should be vigilant for and prevent the overall monopoly of
multinationals in the soybean industry in China.”196
U.S. antitrust policy is designed to promote competition regardless of
the identity, size, or nationality of individual competitors. To the extent that
the U.S. government sees economic and/or national security reasons to
restrict some foreign commercial activities affecting the U.S. market, it does
so pursuant to separate statutory regimes regulating trade, investment, and
national security. To the extent that China uses the AML to address national
security and other concerns unrelated to competition issues, it will diverge
from U.S. practice and may reduce rather than promote competition. For
example, Chinese officials may disapprove of a proposed merger that raises
195
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some anti-monopoly and some national security concerns (and perhaps other
policy concerns), but which would survive scrutiny on either anti-monopoly
or national security grounds standing alone. Such a policy would deter
market entry by competitors that could otherwise enhance efficiency and
benefit consumers in the Chinese market.
J.

Administration

China’s AML provides for the establishment of two anti-monopoly
organizations. An “Anti-Monopoly Commission Under the State Council” is
given a mandate to research and formulate competition policy, assess
competitive conditions in the market, promulgate anti-monopoly guidelines,
and coordinate enforcement efforts.197 An “Anti-Monopoly Enforcement
Authority” is entrusted with enforcing the law directly or through delegation
of authority to regional and local governments.198 Article 9(iv) provides that
one of the Anti-Monopoly Commission’s tasks will be to “[c]oordinat[e]
anti-monopoly administrative enforcement work.”199
In China, interministerial coordination will be required because a
number of ministries administer industry-specific laws that will give rise to
tensions with AML enforcement efforts. Telecommunications, for example,
is one of the seven sectors considered by the State-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission (“SASAC”) to be “critical to the national
economy and national security”200 and over which SASAC intends to
maintain “absolute control.”201 In October 2007, the MII stated, in its
People’s Post and Telecommunications News,202 that “because there is some
197
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overlap in jurisdiction” between the telecom regulator, MII, and the AntiMonopoly Law Enforcement Authority, “the agencies may conflict with one
another in the conduct of authority.”203 MII argues that the AML
Enforcement Authority “shall ask for the opinion of the telecommunications
supervisory agency when investigating competition cases” and that the two
should cooperate including by trying “to regulate the telecom industry
together.” Such statements suggest ministries that have policy agendas not
exclusively devoted to the promotion of competition may seek a role in
influencing AML enforcement policy.
Given the existence of enforcement institutions likely to oppose full
application of the AML, a key challenge facing the new AML authorities
will be the advocacy of AML principles within the councils of the Chinese
government. In the United States, experience has demonstrated that, in the
words of FTC Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras, “the idea of competition as
a way to organize an economy often must struggle against other regulatory
structures that are hostile to free markets.”204 In a famous 1974 address,
then-Chairman of the FTC, Lewis Engman, pointed out how agencies
regulating the U.S. transportation industry effectively sanctioned pricefixing, limited market entry, and in other ways inhibited competition,
thereby acting as a drag on the U.S. economy.205 Over time, advocacy by
U.S. competition agencies and economists helped bring about economic
deregulation in the transportation sector and other regulated areas of the
economy.206 Underlying this emphasis on institutional advocacy has been a
recognition that other agencies can adopt regulations that impair competition
that ordinary consumers are ill-equipped to recognize or to oppose
effectively.207
Article 10 of the AML states that the Anti-Monopoly Law
Enforcement Authority “if appropriate, may empower corresponding
government agencies at the provincial autonomous region, and municipal
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level to be responsible for anti-monopoly enforcement activities in
accordance with this Law.”208 While it is not known whether and to what
extent this provision will be given effect, the prospect that AML
enforcement authority might be delegated to regional and local government
officials with no grounding in competition law or economics is worrying. It
could result in inappropriate AML enforcement actions by local authorities
against foreign firms, influence over AML enforcement by local industry,
inconsistent legal rulings in different regional jurisdictions, and other
problems.
IV.

CONCLUSION

China’s AML is broadly worded and no clarifying guidelines or
decisions have yet been forthcoming, therefore any analysis of the AML
must necessarily be tentative and conditional. In general, China’s enactment
of the AML, after long deliberation and extensive consultations, stands as a
formidable achievement and a significant milestone in its progress towards a
market economy. The full application of its prohibitions on price fixing and
other similar anticompetitive practices will be highly beneficial to the
Chinese economy and consumers. The areas of divergence from U.S.
antitrust practice recall an earlier era in the United States, when antitrust was
an expression of popular anxieties, political and social values, and a system
of economic regulation. Hopefully this article, which highlights what appear
to have been some wrong turns by U.S. antitrust policy in the past, will
prove useful to Chinese policymakers as they prepare to implement the new
law.
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